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Abstract
Network research tries to give solutions within several areas, beginning from
social interconnections, logistic problems, virus spreading, supply networks...etc.
Some metrics have been developed in order to predict blackouts and improve power
grid robustness. Metrics use part of the grid information seeking weakness with-
out simulating the blackout process. On the other hand, simulation models unfold
blackouts.
In this report, we study such metrics and models, seeking that model that could
give us the most relevant information. The models studied in this report represent
blackout as a branch breaking process, a singular line cut or a combination of line
cuts might cause subsequent disconnections and unfold a blackout. The IEEE-14
and IEEE-96 RTS bus systems are used in order to simulate blackouts. Metrics
suggestions are compared with the simulations in these grids in order to know which
metric better captures the critical branches.
None of the studied metrics turns out to indicate always the worst blackout re-
sult as the first option. In addition, the results suggest that the effective resistance
metric did not predict the critical transmission lines of the grid. Electrical between-
ness and net-ability metrics obtain the critical transmission lines within their first
suggestions. However, the results might be better if we also use other relevant in-
formation on the grid as the nominal power flow in each branch or the probability
of having a line cut. Nevertheless, lines that carry a high amount of power flow are
usually more protected and more difficult to being cut and develop a blackout. The
probability of having a single line cut or a combination of line cuts will be useful
in future assessments in order to seek not only the most critical branch cuts, but the
most probable ones.
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Nomenclature
Symbol Description
G Undirected graph
n Number of buses in graph G
m Number of branches in graph G
V Set of nodes of G
E Set of branches of G
yi j Admittance of line (i, j) ∈ E
ri j Resistance of line (i, j) ∈ E
xi j Inductance of line (i, j) ∈ E
bi j Susceptance of line (i, j) ∈ E
gi j Conductance of line (i, j) ∈ E
pi Active power in bus i ∈ V
qi Reactive power in bus i ∈ V
Vi Voltage value in bus i ∈ V
θi Voltage phase in bus i ∈ V
M Incidence matrix
f Power flow vector
p Power injection vector
L Set of load buses in G
G Set of generator buses in G
X Diagonal impedance matrix
θ Phase angles vector
ci j = f maxi j Capacity of line (i, j) ∈ E
c f iP Active power cost function of bus i ∈ G
c f iQ Reactive power cost function of bus i ∈ G
V mini Minimum voltage magnitude in bus i ∈ V
V maxi Maximum voltage magnitude in bus i ∈ V
θmini Minimum voltage phase in bus i ∈ V
θmaxi Maximum voltage phase in bus i ∈ V
pmini Minimum active power in bus i ∈ G
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pmaxi Maximum active power in bus i ∈ G
qmini Minimum reactive power in bus i ∈ G
qmaxi Maximum reactive power in bus i ∈ G
B Laplacian matrix
B+ Inverse of the laplacian matrix using the Penrose pseudo-inverse operator
Ri j = Zij Effective resistance between node i and j
RG Effective graph resistance of G graph
µi ith eigenvalue of the B matrix
Le Electrical betweenness of line e ∈ E
Lpe Positive electrical betweenness of line e ∈ E
Lne Negative electrical betweenness of line e ∈ E
f gdi Change of power flow in line i when injection on generator g and with-
drawal at load d
Cdg Power transmission capacity
E Efficiency
di j Geodesic distance between buses i and j
NG Number of generators in G graph
NL Number of loads in G graph
A Net-Ability metric
Ai Net-Ability level when line i is cut
VAi Vulnerability when line i is cut based on Net-Ability metric
I Island of G graph
piDC Redispatched solution for flow conservation in power injection
pi0 Initial power injection/withdrawal in node i before the blackout
h0 Probability function in order to cut a transmission line that initiates the
blackout in the OPA model
h1 Probability function in order to cut a transmission line that is overloaded
during the blackout in the OPA model
τ Probability in order to cut a transmission line that initiates the blackout in
the improved OPA model
ρ Probability that OPA optimization take place in the improved OPA model
δ
∣∣ f j/c j∣∣u Probability function to cut a branch when is not overloaded in the improved
OPA model
γ Probability to cut a branch when is overloaded in the improved OPA model
β Probability to cut a branch when is considered overloaded in the simplified
improved OPA model
ξ Probability to cut a branch when is overloaded in the simplified improved
OPA model
DL Number of disconnected loads in a blackout
DG Number of disconnected generators in a blackout
DV Number of disconnected buses in a blackout
DE Number of disconnected branches in a blackout
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LS Load Shedding resulted from a blackout
pi Active power injection in generator bus i
pi0 Nominal power injection in generator bus i in order to solve power flow
problem
p f inali Final injection/withdrawal in bus i when a blackout occur
pmaxi Maximum power injection in generator bus i
li Initial demand in bus i
ϖ Relation value between the nominal power injection in generation buses and
their maximum power allowed to inject
f0 Nominal power flow array
υ Relation value between the nominal power flow in each branch and their
maximum power flow allowed
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1
Introduction
Electric power systems are important critical infrastructures that support our
economy and social structure [16]. A power disconnection in a grid could affect
urban transportation systems, heating and cooling systems, computer systems, fac-
tories, communication systems, hospitals, and a huge part of the economic activity.
In our common life we use electricity daily and the real cost of large blackouts is
impossible to measure.
High-voltage transmission systems are designed as a grid with multiple paths
between loads and generators. New renewable energies and increased demand are
stressing these grids, adding more volatility to the power grids’ behavior. A blackout
can be described as a branch breaking process. The causes that initiate this process
are not complex, but huge in quantity. They can be described as natural and human
disturbances as in [17]:
Natural disturbances: e.g, Ice storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes.
Human disturbances: e.g, Human accidents, equipment failures, cyber at-
tacks.
In 2003, a major blackout occurred in Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark.
The coincidence of several faults lead to an excess in the system far above the con-
tingencies and security standards [18]. On the other hand, another example, caused
by a combination of natural and human disturbances occurred in North America in
2003 when high-current arcs where generated between some transmission lines and
nearby trees [17]. The inadequate vegetation management and the growth of trees
generated this blackout. The number of possible causes increases with the power
grid complexity.
Blackout usually occur as the outcome of a series of failures in the power net-
work. Understanding and controlling these cascading mechanisms has became a
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central research problem [22]. In this report blackout in the power network is de-
scribed as a branch breaking process, whereby, branches could became inactive and
unfold other line cuts. Hence, due to some of the above disturbances a branch might
be cut and initiate a power flow redistribution through the network that could af-
fect other transmission lines. Subsequently, some lines could be overloaded and
cut. Some examples of blackout models as a branch breaking processes are [8], [9],
[10], [11], [12] and [13]. In conclusion, it is important to try to prevent blackouts by
studying the behavior of these complex phenomena.
1.1 Purpose
The aim of this Thesis is to explain some basic concepts of the blackout and to
compare different metrics that try to predict critical blackout results. Using blackout
models we can simulate the behavior of this process, therefore, we compare differ-
ent models that represent blackouts as branch breaking processes. Metrics try to
simplify the complexity of grids based on their measured parameters and to obtain
some relevant information. In this report the results of the simulations are compared
with the metric suggestions seeking for the most critical transmission lines in the
system.
1.2 Goals
Study metrics that try to capture important characteristics of the network in
order to predict blackouts
Study models of a branch breaking process that try to simulate the nature of
the blackout and decide on one of them to compare metrics and simulation
results
Analyze which metric has better results compared with the simulations
1.3 Disposition
First of all, in Chapter 2 we explain the Direct Current(DC) power flow simplifi-
cation of a power grid. We also describe metrics that use measured parameters of the
grid in order to capture the critical transmission lines. Furthermore, some blackout
models will be presented and compared. One of these models that represents black-
outs as a branch breaking process will be used in all the following simulations.
Moreover, in Chapter 3 different simulations will be done using IEEE-14 and
IEEE-96 RTS bus systems. The blackout results from cutting a singular branch
14
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is compared with the metrics suggestions. Therefore, the critical branches, those
which unfold the severe blackouts, should be captured by the studied metrics.
15
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Background
In this chapter the DC power flow model is introduced as an approximation of
the AC power flow model. This model simplifies power grid equations, therefore, it
will be easier to simulate blackouts. Furthermore, the transmission line capacities
and the Optimal Power Flow(OPF) are slightly explained. Moreover, three metrics
that seek the critical transmission lines in a power grid are described. Finally, some
blackout models based on branch breaking process are explained in order to seek
one of them and use it in the following simulations.
2.1 DC power flow model
Let G = (V ,E ) be an undirected graph. V := {1,2, ...,n} will be the set of nodes
that represent buses and E := {1,2, ...,m} will be the set of edges that represent
transmission lines or branches in a power grid. Each edge e ∈ E can be given an
arbitrary orientation as (i, j) ∈ E which is directed from i to j and i, j ∈ V .
For each transmission line e = (i, j) ∈ E we have a resistance ri j and an induc-
tance xi j, therefore the admittance, the susceptance and the conductance of branch
e as yi j, bi j and gi j respectively are termed below:
yi j =
1
ri j + xi jj
; bi j =
∣∣yi j∣∣sin(arg(yi j)) ; gi j = ∣∣yi j∣∣cos(arg(yi j))
yi j = gi j +bi jj
Each bus i ∈ V has an active power value pi, a reactive power value qi a voltage
magnitude Vi and a voltage phase θi. The AC power flow model represents the power
grid behavior as is described in [1] and [2]:
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pi =
n
∑
j=1 j 6=i
|Vi|2 gi j−|Vi|
∣∣Vj∣∣{ gi j cos(θi−θ j)+bi j sin(θi−θ j) } (2.1)
qi =
n
∑
j=1 j 6=i
−|Vi|2 bi j−|Vi|
∣∣Vj∣∣{ −bi j cos(θi−θ j)+gi j sin(θi−θ j) } (2.2)
At this point some assumptions are needed in order to develop the DC model:
1. The resistance of transmission circuits is significantly less than the impedance.
As a result the admittance is computed using only the impedance and the conduc-
tance is 0.
ri j xi j→ bi j ≈− 1xi j gi j ≈ 0
pi ≈ ∑nj=1 j 6=i−|Vi|
∣∣Vj∣∣{ +bi j sin(θi−θ j) }
qi ≈ ∑nj=1 j 6=i−|Vi|2 bi j−|Vi|
∣∣Vj∣∣{ −bi j cos(θi−θ j) }
2. The difference between phase angles of connected buses is sufficiently small.
Then, the cosine of the difference is close to one and the sine of the difference is
approximated to the difference value:
θi ≈ θ j→ cos(θi−θ j)≈ 1 sin(θi−θ j)≈ (θi−θ j)
pi ≈ ∑nj=1 j 6=i−|Vi|
∣∣Vj∣∣{ +bi j (θi−θ j) }
qi ≈ ∑nj=1 j 6=i−|Vi|2 bi j−|Vi|
∣∣Vj∣∣{ −bi j }
3. The numerical values of voltage magnitudes in every bus are unity:
|Vi|= 1 ∀i ∈ E
pi ≈ ∑nj=1 j 6=i−bi j (θi−θ j)
qi ≈ 0
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As a consequence of applying the assumptions of fast decoupled and DC power
flow, the active power is bigger than the reactive power in each bus: PiQi. Hence
a two non-linear functions problem is solved as a one linear function problem. The
active power is calculated as below:
pi ≈
n
∑
j=1 j 6=i
+
1
xi j
(θi−θ j)
In order to rewrite the DC power flow model in a more compact way we introduce
all the necessary vectors and matrices below as in [20]:
Incidence matrix M : nxm.
For each branch e = (i, j), where i, j ∈ V , Mie =+1 and M je =−1.
Mie =
 +1 e = (i, j)−1 e = ( j, i)0 otherwise

Power flow vector f : mx1 = ( fe : e ∈ E ).
fe represents the power flow of transmission line e.
Power injection vector p : nx1 = (pi : i ∈ V ).
pi represents the injection or withdrawal of bus i. Because of the flow conser-
vation the sum of all the entries is zero ∑ni=1 pi = 0. Below load and generator
buses are described:
L(p) := {i ∈ V : pi < 0} G(p) := {i ∈ V : pi > 0}
Diagonal impedance matrix X : mxm.
Each entry Xee = xi j. Where xi j is the impedance between bus i and bus j and
e = (i, j) ∈ E is the transmission line that connect that nodes.
Phase angles vector θ : nx1 = (θi : i ∈ V ) .
θi represents the voltage phase of node i.
Finally the DC model is computed assuming a fixed p and θ (reference bus) = 0
using flow conservation:
M f = p (2.3)
X f = M′θ (2.4)
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The resulting f and θ vectors are the power flow solution. As relevant detail of
this model is the similitude between the equations below:
fi j =
θi−θ j
xi j
→ I = ∆U
R
This is why this approximation to the AC model is called DC model.
2.2 Transmission lines capacities
A blackout can be described as a breaking branches process. Hence it is neces-
sary to declare transmission line capacities. These boundaries represent the maxi-
mum permitted power flow that each transmission line can carry symmetrically in
negative or positive value:
ci j = ce = f maxi j = f
max
e ≥
∣∣ fi j∣∣ ∀e = (i, j) ∈ E
Thereby, the blackout phenomena are developed due to the existence of these
capacities. If any branch exceeds its own ci j value, it will be overloaded and cut.
The blackout models described later in this report are based on the existence of
these limits: [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] and [13].
2.3 Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
In normal operation state the power flow problem is solved based on economic
and security factors as described in [2], [21] and [23]. Hence, the power generated
is measured in economic terms and by paying attention to the system boundaries.
Therefore, the objective function is a summation of individual polynomial cost func-
tions c f iP and c f
i
Q of real and reactive power injections for each generator respec-
tively. This is the OPF problem for the AC power flow model where fi j is composed
by active and reactive power flow:
minimize ∑i∈G c f iP (pi)+ c f iQ (qi) ∀i ∈ G
subject to:
∣∣ fi j∣∣≤ f maxi j ∀(i, j) ∈ E
V mini ≤ |Vi| ≤V maxi ∀i ∈ V
θmini ≤ θi ≤ θmaxi ∀i ∈ V
pmini ≤ pi ≤ pmaxi ∀i ∈ G
qmini ≤ qi ≤ qmaxi ∀i ∈ G
Equation (2.1) ∀i ∈ V
Equation (2.2) ∀i ∈ V
θ (reference bus) = 0
19
Chapter 2. Background
Here |Vi| and qi is the voltage magnitude and reactive power of bus i. While, the
reference bus is the only node where the voltage phase is known and referring to
these value we can get the remaining values. This optimization is subject to the
AC power flow model. When we work with the DC power flow model the OPF is
simplified too. It will not depend on voltage magnitude and reactive power:
minimize ∑i∈G c f iP (pi) ∀i ∈ G
subject to:
∣∣ fi j∣∣≤ f maxi j ∀(i, j) ∈ E
θmini ≤ θi ≤ θmaxi ∀i ∈ V
pmini ≤ pi ≤ pmaxi ∀i ∈ G
M f = p
X f = M′θ
θ (reference bus) = 0
In this case, the optimization is also subject to the DC power flow model, given
by equations (2.3) and (2.4). In the OPF model the active power in generation buses
is treated as variables and in load buses as constants. Therefore, the minimization
function aim is to allow a proper power injection in generation with assuming a
fixed demand in all load buses.
If this model is used assuming an initial line cut, the result of the optimization
might be infeasible. This is due to that one or more capacities will be meet. In this
case, any information about the following cut lines can not be retrieved. While if no
blackout is unfolded the result is feasible. Consequently, this model is satisfactory
for normal operational problems, despite not being able to represent the blackout
activity correctly.
2.4 Network metrics
The topological complex network based metrics fall short in order to predict
power grid robustness against blackouts as declared in [3], [4] and [5]. “Net-ability”
and “electrical betweenness” are some extended topological metrics. The aim of
these contributions is that the pure topological metrics ignore the electrical prop-
erties and the working boundaries of networks. In addition, the topological metric
“effective resistance” uses the electrical relation between buses to describe the vul-
nerability of a grid. Hence, all these metrics are based on electrical factors in order
to measure power grid robustness.
Effective resistance
The effective resistance measures the differential potential between two nodes
when a unit of current goes from one bus to the other [6,7]. In order to get this value
20
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we could use the Laplacian matrix. This matrix is constructed by the impedances of
the transmission lines as follows:
Laplacian matrix B : nxn.
Bi j =
{ −1
xi j
i 6= j
∑k 6=i +1xik i = j
}
The effective resistance between two nodes could be computed as described in
[6,7]:
Ri j = B+ii +B
+
j j−2B+i j
The B+ is the inverse matrix of B using the Penrose pseudo-inverse operator. It
is also possible to calculate the effective resistance between node i and j using the
differential potential between two nodes. In Figure 2.1 is shown an example in order
to calculate the effective resistance between two buses:
Figure 2.1 Example with a triangular bus system used to show how to calculate
the effective resistance between two buses. The red bus is injects a unity of injection
and the green bus demand a unity of withdrawal. It is also show the p array and the
M and X matrix.
A fixed p vector with 0 in all its entries except for the ith and the jth entries (in
this case the red and green buses), with 1 and −1 as values respectively. Then, with
this fixed p and θ (bus 1) = 0, θ and f arrays are calculated using the DC power
flow model (Equations (2.3) and (2.4)):
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f =
 0.50.5
0.5
 θ =
 0−0.05
−0.15

Finally, the effective resistance between the red and the green bus in Figure 2.1
will be computed as the difference between voltage phases of these two buses.
Therefore, the effective resistance between them is equal to 0.15.
The effective graph resistance is defined as the sum of all the effective resistances
[6,7]:
RG =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=i+1
Ri j
In the network of Figure 2.1 it is necessary to calculate R12 and R23. In this
case R12 = 0.083 and R23 = 0.133, therefore the effective graph resistance will be
RG = 0.366. This can also be calculated using the eigenvalues [6,7] of the Laplacian
matrix B, where µ is a non zero eigenvalue of B:
RG = n
n−1
∑
i=1
1
µi
The electrical topology of a power grid has a major importance in the network
dynamics rather than the physical topology. Therefore, the effective resistance be-
tween two buses represents the equivalent impedance between them. A higher num-
ber of possible paths between two nodes will represent robustness, because in case
of a link failure, power flow will be easily redispatched into other paths. A consistent
distribution of the impedance values will also result in a more robust grid. In these
cases where the number of paths between nodes is higher and the impedances are
similarly organized the computed value of the effective graph resistance is smaller.
Electrical betweenness
This metric is the sum of branches’ sensitivity to the change of power injec-
tion/withdrawal, weighted by the capacity of relevant transmission lines. Each
branch will be represented by a single electrical betweenness value, the higher it
is the more critical the branch is. As is described in [3] the electrical betweenness
of each line is defined as follows:
Li = max
[∣∣Lpi ∣∣ , |Lni |] ∀i ∈ E
22
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Here Lpi and L
n
i represent the positive and negative electrical betweenness respec-
tively, depending on the sign of the resulting f gdi :
Lpi = ∑g∈G∑d∈L C
d
g f
gd
i where the sum is taken over terms when f
gd
i > 0
Lni = ∑g∈G∑d∈L Cdg f
gd
i where the sum is taken over terms when f
gd
i < 0
Considering g as an injection bus generator and d as a withdrawal bus load the
power transmission capacity Cdg is the power injected by g when the first line reaches
its limit. f gdi is the change of power flow in line i when injection is on generator g
and withdrawal at load d. In order to calculate these values it is necessary to solve
the power flow problem, where pg = 1, pd = −1 and for all the remaining entries
pi = 0:
M f gd = p
X f gd = M′θ gd
θ(reference bus) = 0
Thereby, Cdg is calculated as follow:
Cdg = min
 f max1∣∣∣ f gd1 ∣∣∣ , . . . ,
f maxm∣∣∣ f gdm ∣∣∣

Here f maxe is the capacity of line e. Hence, it is necessary to calculate branch
power flows for each combination of generators and loads, capture the most
stressed transmission line and weight each line power flows with the transmission
capacityCdg . Figure 2.2 unfolds an example of this calculation:
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Figure 2.2 Example with a triangle bus system used to show how to calculate
the electrical betweenness. The red and the green buses are the only generator and
load respectively. For each branch there is a capacity and an impedance value. Here
f is the power flow array from the DC model solution, while C31 , L
p and Ln are the
transmission capacity of generator bus 1 and load bus 3 and, the negative and positive
electrical betweenness respectively. The more critical branches are (1,2) and (2,3).
Electrical betweenness metric Li indicates the criticality of branch i. Hence, a
transmission line will be more critical as this metric is higher. Therefore, in this
example the most critical branches are transmission lines (1,2) and (2,3).
Net-ability
The net-ability metric described in [4] is extended from efficiency considering
electric distance and line flow limits. The efficiency E quantifies the overall per-
formance of a network as the mean geodesic distance over all pairs of buses in the
network:
E =
1
NGNL
∑
i6= j∈V
1
di j
Here di j is the geodesic distance defined as the number of branches in the shortest
path between i and j buses, while NG and NL are the total number of generator and
load buses respectively. As is described above, the net-ability metric is calculated
considering electrical distance Zdg and line flow limits C
d
g :
A =
1
NGNL
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈L
Cdg
Zdg
24
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Here Cdg is the power transmission capacity defined in the electrical betweenness
point and Zdg is the effective resistance between nodes g and d already described:
Zdg = Rgd
In addition, the vulnerability of line i is defined as the net-ability decrease caused
by a cut in line i:
VAi =
A−Ai
A
Here Ai is the net-ability level when line i is cut. Hence the most critical edge has
the highest value of VAi and the lowest value of Ai.
Remark
It is necessary to emphasize that, with the metrics described, there are two ways
to measure robustness:
1. The vulnerability of a grid in its normal working state when an individual
transmission line is cut.
2. The robustness of a grid against blackout attacks when an individual branch
is added to the structure.
In one case the robustness is seen as an attack to a static grid and on the other hand
the second point adds the idea of improvement from the initial state. The electrical
betweenness is not able to measure this second kind of robustness because it has
focused on the branch significances on the grid. However, the other two metrics
(effective resistance and net-ability) can be used in both cases as they try to measure
the structural robustness when some alteration takes place in the grid. In this report,
we will focus on the first point. Moreover, a simple example is shown in order to
see how each metric could have different results:
25
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Figure 2.3 Example with a square bus system used to show the differences between
metrics
X01 = 0.4 X02 = 0.3 X12 = 0.04 X23 = 0.4 X13 = 0.1
C01 = 3 C02 = 0.4 C12 = 1 C23 = 1 C13 = 2
The metrics described in this point are applied using the power grid in Figure 2.3
with the transmission line data above. Furthermore, the results are different for each
metric, showing that they could obtain distinct transmission lines in looking for the
critical branches:
Metric Electrical Betweenness Effective resistance Net-ability
Critical branch 0-2 1-3 0-1
Table 2.1 Figure 2.3 critical branch suggestions using different metrics
2.5 Blackout models
Blackouts can occur from many causes. Nodes in models represent generators
and loads that can fail and develop a blackout. However, in this report, we will
study the blackouts as a breaking branch process. In the models explained below
the blackout starts with a branch cut that develops other transmission line cuts and
the subsequent blackout. In a real power grid at least a N-1 level of security is used.
This means that it is impossible for a blackout to occur with a single branch cut as
is explained in [14].
In this section a blackout characterization and some blackout models based on a
branch breaking process are described. First of all, we describe the blackout charac-
terization. Secondly, we introduce the Static model that is the most simple example
26
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of a blackout model that we could develop. Furthermore, two more blackout models
are taken into consideration in this assessment. Finally, we will decide to use one of
these models in the following simulations.
Blackout characterization
In order to classify and delimit the criticality between different blackouts it is
necessary to enumerate the distinct blackout levels. Furthermore, we define the fol-
lowing terms:
number of disconnected loads DL
number of disconnected generators DG
number of disconnected buses DV = DG+DL
number of disconnected lines DE
load shedding LS =
∑i∈L
(
p f inali −pi0
)
∑i∈L(−pi0)
(2.5)
Here pi0 and p
f inal
i are the initial and the final withdrawal in the load bus i during
the blackout. Therefore, the LS result will be the proportion of demand in loads
that can not be supported by generators when the blackout has occurred. In order
for the importance on demand on loads to prevail over the rest, the classification is
simplified using these two terms: DL and LS. This characterization is enumerated
from the less important to the more significant blackout:
No blackout LS = 0, DL = 0, DE ≥ 0, and DG ≥ 0
When some lines and generators could be disconnected but no load is dis-
jointed from the network and no load shedding exists.
Small blackout LS > 0, DL = 0, DE ≥ 0, and DG ≥ 0
When some load shedding happens without any load disconnection.
Intermediate blackout LS > 0, DL > 0, DE ≥ 0, and DG ≥ 0
Some load shedding and load bus disconnection take place in a blackout.
Total blackout LS = 1
No load bus is connected to any generator. The blackout is complete.
In summary, given the Load Shedding value LS the impact of the blackout can be
correctly characterized. Blackouts will be categorized as more critical when LS is
higher.
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Static model
In the Static model the power flows are calculated directly using the DC power
flow equations and if any flow exceeds the capacity of its branch, this transmission
line is cut. There is no upper bound on the amount of energy that generators can
supply and loads have their initial values if they are still connected to the grid, and
zero if they are disconnected. If a load is still connected to a generator it is still
joined to the grid. Capacities are sufficient in order to maintain a normal operation
mode. Therefore, it is necessary to cut an initial transmission line for a blackout to
occur. First, we will describe the static model procedure using an example and then
the algorithm will be detailed.
Figure 2.4 will be used in order to explain the Static model. As seen in (a) there
are four buses, one generator with +1 as injection and one load with -1 as with-
drawal. There are also five branches with different capacity values ( C01, C02, C12,
C13 and C23 ) and three possible conductivity values ( A, B and 1 ). The conduc-
tivity value is the inverse of the impedance in lines, therefore, a higher conductivity
will represent a relative increase of power flow in that branch. In this example A and
B are considered higher than 1. As said above, all branches have sufficient capacity
to work correctly in normal grid operation. The power flow within all the branches
of Figure 2.4 (a) are below:
f01 = B+AAB+B+2A f02 =
AB+A
AB+B+2A f12 =
−AB+B
AB+B+2A
f23 = A+BAB+B+2A f13 =
A+AB
AB+B+2A
In this model if any branch has exceeded its capacity ci j < fi j it will be cut.
As written above the capacities are enough to support normal operation values,
therefore, it is necessary to cut a line in order to unfold a blackout. Furthermore,
as seen in Figure 2.4(b) the 1-3 branch is triggered and the power flow has a new
solution:
f01 = BAB+B+2A f02 =
AB+A
AB+B+2A f12 =
B
AB+B+2A f23 = 1
Here the 2-3 branch has increased its power flow and also 1-2 line could have
increased its flow ( depending on A and B values ). Therefore, the case where | f23|>
C23 & | f12|<C12 is shown in (c) and the disconnection between generator and load
is complete. However, there is also the possibility that | f23| < C23 & | f12| > C12
and it will result in Figure 2.4(d):
f01 = 0 f02 = 1 f23 = 1
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At this point in Figure 2.4(d) it is assumed that 1 < C23. Therefore, the only
possible transmission line that could be cut is the 0-2 branch which is the only
line that has increased its flow. In this case the disconnected graph is shown in
Figure 2.4(e).
Figure 2.4 Static model example when 1-3 branch is cut
In this example, there is only one generator and load, thereby when they are dis-
connected power injection and withdrawal will be 0 respectively. However, it is
necessary to recalculate the power injections if there are more loads and generators
with an initial power injection/withdrawal and some of these loads or generators
were disconnected. The load withdrawals never change their values if they are still
connected to some generators and there is no limit in power generator injections.
Furthermore, the injection increase or decrease is assumed to be shared homoge-
neously between all generators, in order to get the most probable option. It could be
possible to generate islands with generators and loads disconnected between them,
thus, the power injection is calculated with the buses of each island. In conclusion,
it can be stated that the Static model uses the DC power flow problem without any
boundaries, maintaining the initial demand in loads and redistributing proportion-
ally the power injected by the generators.
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In addition, Figure 2.5 represents an initial square grid in Figure 2.5(a) and the
same grid with an additional grid between nodes 1 and 2 in Figure 2.5(b). As in the
example below the power injection in node 0 is +1 and the withdrawal in node 3 is
-1. Although in this example A < 1 and B > 1. Moreover, the power flow results in
Figure 2.5(a) is below:
f01 = 12 f02 =
1
2 f23 =
1
2 f13 =
1
2
Consequently, the A value does not change the power flow in Figure 2.5(a). After
adding the 1-2 branch the power flow will be:
f01 = B+AAB+B+2A f02 =
AB+A
AB+B+2A f12 =
−AB+B
AB+B+2A
f23 = A+BAB+B+2A f13 =
A+AB
AB+B+2A
Here f01 = f23 > f02 = f13 and f01 = f23 > 12 . Thereby, in this example it is shown
that by adding a new line it is possible to increase power flow on other lines. These
lines can be more stressed, thus, adding one line in order to improve robustness
could be damaging as a blackout unfolds. In summary, power grids behavior is
complex and very difficult to predict when complexity increases.
Figure 2.5 Static model example when 1-2 branch is added. It illustrates that
adding a line can increase power flow on other lines, and initiate a power collapse.
Therefore, as described above the algorithm of this model works as follows:
1. It is decided to cut one line.
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2. In this point some loads, generators or a set of both could be disconnected
from the network. In other words, if some loads are not connected to any
generator and/or some generators are not linked with any load bus then these
nodes are disconnected from the entire network. It is understood that the grid
could evolve into different sets of networks with generators and loads. Let
I be an island of graph G . Hence, in each island the power generation is
calculated as below:
∀I ∈ G
piDC = pi0− −∑ j∈L∩I p j0−∑ j∈G∩I p j0number of buses in G∩I ∀i ∈ G∩I
piDC = pi0 ∀i ∈ L∩I
This is the most simplest algorithm in order to recalculate power injection,
it is proportional to the initial power injection. Here pi0 is the initial power
injection/withdrawal in node i before any line is cut. While piDC is the re-
dispatched power injection in bus i in order to achieve flow conservation.
With pDC values the DC power flow solution is reachable. If some buses are
disconnected due to the blackout this formula allows the power injection in
generators to be redistributed with the same cost.
3. The DC power flow is calculated:
M f = piDC
X f = M′θ
θ(refbus) = 0
4. If in some line the power flow exceeds its capacity fi j > ci j this line will
be cut and step 2 will be repeated. If no line is overloaded the blackout is
finished.
OPA model
The ORNL-PSerc-Alaska (OPA) model is developed in [8], [9], [10] and [11], and
validated in [12]. This model tries to develop two different behaviors in power grid
system using the DC model:
1. Slow dynamics:A slow time scale, between days and years, is used in order
to increase load and improve branch capacities.
2. Fast dynamics: In contrast, the blackout event unfolds using the result of the
slow dynamics as a peak in load demand. The cascading events of a blackout
take place in a faster time scale although the period of events is neglected.
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The fast dynamics algorithm represents the blackout behavior therefore, there is
no need to study slow dynamics. OPA fast dynamics explains in a very simple way
how the control could interact in the blackout process. There are generation bound-
aries and using an optimization problem similar to the OPF model, the power flow
problem and redispatch of power injection is calculated. Although, in this case Load
Shedding is allowed. In this optimization the result is subject to the transmission
line boundaries, and because Load Shedding is allowed there is always an optimal
solution. However, in this model lines that are close to exceed their capacities are
considered overloaded and could be cut.
The blackout is developed with this set of iterations below:
1. Line cut events are initiated according to a probability function as below:
Probability line j outaged = h0
(
f j
c j
)
Here h0 is a positive and non-decreasing function. Then, if no lines are cut
the iteration is finished.
2. The power injection is redispatched according to an optimization to minimize
the change in generation and load shedding subject to DC model limits:
minimize ∑i∈G |pi− pi0|+ω∑i∈L (pi− pi0)
flow limits c j = f maxj ≥
∣∣ f j∣∣ ∀i ∈ E
M f = p
X f = M′θ
Bus i load limit 0≥ pi ≥ pi0 ∀i ∈ L
Bus i gen limit pmaxi ≥ pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G
Reference bus θ(refbus) = 0
Here pmaxi is the maximum power injection of i generator bus. While ω is
a high value in order to penalize load shedding from injection changes in
generation buses. In all this report we will use ω = 100, consistently with [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12] and [13].
3. A line is considered overloaded when f j ≥ 0.99c j and will be cut with some
probability:
Probability overloaded line j outaged = h1
(
f j
c j
)
Here h1 is a positive and non-decreasing function.
4. If some line is cut in step 3 then step 4 is repeated. Therefore, if any line is
not cut the fast dynamics breaking process is finished.
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Improved OPA model
This model is developed as an improvement of the OPA model in [13]. The prin-
cipal differences for this report are those developed in the fast dynamics. In this
model, firstly the power flow solution is calculated as in the static model but is paid
to attention to the maximum power injected in generators in the power injection
redistribution. If any line is overloaded at this step there is a probability of using the
OPA optimization. Therefore, this model tries to mix both models studied above. In
addition the probabilities used in the OPA model in order to cut a line are changed
in this model.
The blackout sequence is as below:
1. Initialization: Every transmission line has probability τ of being cut.
2. The DC power flow is calculated, and similar to the static model we do not
take flow limits into consideration. Before this calculation, it is essential to
redistribute power injection because the grid may be separated into several
islands. If the total generation is greater than the total load, the power injec-
tion in generators is decreased in proportion to their initial condition. If the
total generation is less than the total load, the active power generated is in-
creased according to the reserve capacities. If the total generation capacity is
less than the total demand, load shedding will be implemented in every load
node proportional to its load amount. Therefore, in this case limits in power
generation could cause load shedding.
3. If no line is overloaded the fast dynamics iteration is finished. However, if
some line is overloaded the iteration continues.
4. With a probability ρ , the power injection is redispatched according to an op-
timization that minimizes the change in generation and load shedding subject
to DC model constraints and flow limits. If ρ = 1 the optimization will be
always done, if ρ = 0 it will be never done:
minimize ∑i∈G |pi− pi0|+ω∑i∈L (pi− pi0)
flow limits c j = f maxj ≥
∣∣ f j∣∣ ∀i ∈ E
M f = p
X f = M′θ
Bus i load limit 0≥ pi ≥ pinitiali ∀i ∈ L
Bus i gen limit pmaxi ≥ pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G
Reference bus θ(refbus) = 0
5. After the optimization in step 4 every transmission line has the δ
∣∣ f j/c j∣∣u
probability formula in order to be tripped. u is considered with a value of 10.
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If the optimization is not applied, then with the result of the second step any
overloaded line is cut with a γ probability. The rest of the lines will also be
tripped with a δ
∣∣ f j/c j∣∣u probability.
6. If some lines are cut in the last step then step 2 is repeated. If no line is cut
the fast dynamics is finished.
Simplified improved OPA model
Given the models described above, we will decide upon one them in order to
achieve our goals and use it in our simulations. The most complete model is the
improved OPA model that tries to complement both the OPA and the Static model
behaviors at the same time. Therefore, the iteration used in the simulations is the
fast dynamics of the improved OPA model with some simplifications. This algo-
rithm will be termed as the simplified improved OPA model. The full algorithm is
described below:
1. Initialization: One line is selected to be cut.
2. At this point the power injection and withdrawal is redistributed. In point 3.1
this redistribution is explained. From this step a new pDC array is developed
for the next step.
3. The DC power flow is calculated:
M f = pDC
X f = M′θ
θ(refbus) = 0
4. If no lines are overloaded ∀ j ∈ E c j ≥ f j the blackout iteration is fin-
ished. In the other case continue.
5. The power injection is redispatched with a ρ probability according to an op-
timization to minimize the change in generation and load shedding subject to
DC model constraints and flow limits:
minimize ∑i∈G |pi− pi0|+ω∑i∈L (pi− pi0)
flow limits c j = f maxj ≥
∣∣ f j∣∣ ∀i ∈ E
M f = p
X f = M′θ
Bus i load limit 0≥ pi ≥ pi0 ∀i ∈ L
Bus i gen limit pmaxi ≥ pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G
Reference bus θ(refbus) = 0
34
2.5 Blackout models
6. If the redispatch described in step 5 is done, an overloaded line will be con-
sidered when 0.99c j ≤ f j. But when the optimization is not done a line will
be overloaded when c j ≤ f j. All overloaded lines are cut depending on the
next algorithm:
∀(overloaded line j) ∈ E
if 0.99c j ≤ f j < c j then
line j is cut with a probability of β
else if f j ≥ c j then
line j is cut with a probability of ξ
end
7. If some lines are disconnected in step 6 then, step 2 is repeated. Therefore, if
any line is not cut the blackout iteration is concluded.
As is shown we have simplified the probabilities of cutting a transmission line.
It is possible to select one line as the start of the branch breaking process. In addi-
tion, only the overloaded branches and the transmission lines that are close to their
capacity could be cut in the development of the blackout.
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Simulations
In this chapter some simulations are developed for two different bus systems us-
ing the simplified improved OPA model. The metrics explained above and two sim-
ple attacks described in this chapter are used in order to prevent blackouts. Firstly,
we will describe how we use the bus system data and how the injection/withdrawal
redistribution necessary in the simplified improve OPA model, works. After the
simulations of each bus systems a discussion will describe the blackout and metrics
results.
At this point we will simulate blackout activity on IEEE-14 and IEEE-96 RTS bus
systems that can be found in [19]. In order to know if metrics are able to give us rel-
evant information we will compare blackout results and metrics suggestions. In all
the following simulations the probabilities used in order to cut overloaded transmis-
sion lines, β and ξ (step 6 of simplified improve OPA model), are 1, therefore, we
will obtain the worst possible blackout results. Thereby, if any line is overloaded,
it will be cut. In those systems, generators can have power injection and demand
information. The power injected, considered for generator bus, is the difference be-
tween its injection and its demand, thereby if the power injected is less than the
demand in a generator bus, this will be considered a load. In these bus systems the
maximum power injected by generators is unknown, therefore, this value must be
calculated using injection and demand in each generator as below:
pi0 =−li ∀i ∈ L
pi0 = pi− li ∀i ∈ G
pmaxi = ϖ (pi− li) ∀i ∈ G
Here li and pi are the demand and injection data from bus i respectively obtained
from the bus system. While pi0 is the injection/withdrawal of the bus i and pmaxi
is maximum possible power injected from the generator i respectively. ϖ is the
constant value that represents the maximum injection a generator could inject using
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the normal power injected by this bus. In both studied bus systems we do not have
the maximum power injection, thus, we will always use ϖ = 1.2 assuming that all
generators are able to support 20% more active power than in the normal state.
3.1 Redistribution of power injection and withdrawal
It is necessary to have a proper redistribution law when loads and generators are
disconnected of the initial grid. This developed redistribution will be used in the
second step of the simplified improved OPA algorithm shown in section 2.5.
When the blackout unfolds some loads, generators or both could be disconnected
from the network. In other words, if some loads are not connected with any gener-
ator and/or some generators are not linked with any load bus then these nodes are
disconnected from the entire network. It is understood that if a set of linked loads
and generators is disconnected from the initial network, the grid evolves into two
sets of networks with generators and loads. Let I be an island of graph G . Hence,
in each island the power generation and load demand is computed with this simple
algorithm:
∀I ∈ G
if (−∑i∈L∩I pi0 > ∑i∈G∩I pmaxi ) then
piDC = pi0− pi0−∑ j∈L∩I p j0−∑ j∈G∩I p
max
j
−∑ j∈L∩I p j0 ∀i ∈ L∩I
piDC = pmaxi ∀i ∈ G∩I
else if (−∑i∈L∩I pi0 ≤ ∑i∈G∩I pmaxi ) then
piDC = pi0 ∀i ∈ L∩I
piDC = pi0+ pi
−∑ j∈L∩I p j0−∑ j∈G∩I p j0
∑ j∈G∩I p j ∀i ∈ G∩I
end
3.2 IEEE-14 bus system
IEEE-14 bus system is a 14 bus power grid with 5 generators, 9 load buses and
20 transmission lines. Branch impedances and bus nominal demands and injections
are known. Maximum power injection in generator buses and transmission line ca-
pacities are not given. Zero nominal power is injected in generator buses 3, 6 and 8,
therefore, they will be considered as loads. Generator 1 and 2 inject all the demand.
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Figure 3.1 IEEE-14 bus system used in order to simulate blackouts [24]
In this system, transmission lines are unknown. In other assessments as [15] they
obtain the capacities using a constant value called tolerance value. Firstly, the nom-
inal power flow for each line is calculated using the DC power flow problem as
follows:
M f0 = p0
X f = M′θ
θ(refbus) = 0
Furthermore, the tolerance value υ is used to calculate the transmission line ca-
pacities as below:
c j = υ
∣∣ f j0∣∣ ∀ j ∈ E
Capacities in power grids do not depend only on the nominal power flow of their
branches and cut securities are normalized. Therefore, it is common to see a lot
of transmission lines with the same capacities and different nominal power flows.
Obviously those capacities are always higher than the nominal power flow in each
branch. Hence, another possibility in order to apply capacities could be to decide
4 capacity values and apply them depending on the power flow of each branch. In
this case we decided as in Table 3.1. In the following simulations we will use both
concepts in order to obtain the appropriate capacities, therefore, we could get more
information.
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Number line From bus- To bus Nominal flow Capacity
1 1-2 149.53 250
2 1-5 71.44 100
3 2-3 69.99 100
4 2-4 55.11 100
5 2-5 40.75 100
6 3-4 -24.20 50
7 4-5 -62.50 100
8 4-7 28.98 50
9 4-9 16.62 50
10 5-6 42.09 100
11 6-11 6.31 20
12 6-12 7.54 20
13 6-13 17.04 50
14 7-8 0.0 20
15 7-9 28.98 50
16 9-10 6.19 20
17 9-14 9.92 20
18 10-11 -2.81 20
19 12-13 1.44 20
20 13-14 4.98 20
Table 3.1 IEEE-14 bus system capacities used in the simulations. The nominal
power flow is calculated using the DC power flow model. We decided to use this 4
capacity values depending on the nominal power flow.
IEEE-14 bus system simulations
Firstly, we are going to use different tolerance values υ and show which met-
ric could find the worst possible blackout. Therefore, below in Figure 3.2 we can
show the worst blackout result (orange and blue) and the average of all possible
blackouts cutting an individual line (red) for each tolerance value using ρ = 0 and
ρ = 1. The load shedding LS can have values from 0 to 1 as shown in the normalize
Equation (2.5). A bigger load shedding will present a more critical blackout.
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Figure 3.2 "MAX LS" is the maximum LS obtained cutting one line and "LS aver-
age" is the LS average obtained cutting all the transmission lines. The y-axis repre-
sent the load shedding resulted from a blackout and the x-axis represent the tolerance
value υ . The left figure represents the case when ρ = 0 and the right one represents
the case when ρ = 1. The load shedding average decrease with the increase of toler-
ance value and the results using ρ = 1 are less critical.
The capacities increase uniformly with the tolerance value, therefore, the metrics
result will always be the same. The next table shows which line is the most critical
for each metric:
Metric Elec. Bet. Eff. Res. Net-ability
Line cut 8 10 7
Table 3.2 IEEE-14 bus system critical lines suggestion for each metric
We can also apply other kind of attacks in order to obtain the worst blackout:
Node significance: Cut the most important branch of the most signifi-
cant node. Thus, cut the line connected to the bus with highest injec-
tion/withdrawal (in absolute value), where nominal power flow is higher than
the rest of the edges connected to this bus.
Highest power flow: Cut the line with the largest nominal power flow level.
Attack Node sign. Highest pow.
Line cut 1 1
Table 3.3 IEEE-14 bus system critical lines suggestion for each attack
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The following figures show the LS result for υ values between 1.025 and 1.7, for
ρ = 0 and ρ = 1, and for the different cut lines depending on the metric used in
each case. This figures show the individual branch cut that each metric suggested in
Table 3.2, where in Figure 3.2 is presented the average of all branch cuts, for every
tolerance value.
Figure 3.3 "MAX LS" is the maximum LS obtained cutting one line and "LS Lp
Ln" is the LS obtained cutting the transmission line pointed by the electrical be-
tweenness metric. The y-axis represent the load shedding resulted from a blackout
and the x-axis represent the tolerance value υ . The left figure represents the case
when ρ = 0 and the right one represents the case when ρ = 1. There is a tolerance
value where the cut on this particular branch get less critical.
Figure 3.3 shows less critical load shedding using ρ = 1 in coherence with Fig-
ure 3.2. In addition, in coherence Figure 3.2, there is a tolerance value where a cut
on this particular branch get less critical.
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Figure 3.4 "MAX LS" is the maximum LS obtained cutting one line and "Effective
res" is the LS obtained cutting the transmission line pointed by the effective resis-
tance metric. The y-axis represent the load shedding resulted from a blackout and
the x-axis represent the tolerance value υ . The left figure represents the case when
ρ = 0 and the right one represents the case when ρ = 1. In this case with υ = 1.225
and υ = 1.25 we get less critical load shedding using ρ = 0.
In Figure 3.4 we see that for υ = 1.225 and υ = 1.25 we get less critical load
shedding using ρ = 0. These are some of the exceptions where ρ = 1 obtain worst
blackout results. In general with ρ = 0 blackouts results are worst as shown in
Figure 3.2. For the rest of the tolerance values we obtain equal or worst results
using ρ = 0.
Figure 3.5 "MAX LS" is the maximum LS obtained cutting one line and "LS
net_A" is the LS obtained cutting the transmission line pointed by the net-ability
metric. The y-axis represent the load shedding resulted from a blackout and the x-
axis represent the tolerance value υ . The left figure represents the case when ρ = 0
and the right one represents the case when ρ = 1. With ρ = 1 the same load shedding
is obtained. In addition for ρ = 0 the LS is always worst and with a little descend at
υ = 1.375 similar to the figures above.
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Figure 3.5 unfolds that with ρ = 1 the same load shedding is obtained. In addition
for ρ = 0 the LS is always worst and with a little descend at υ = 1.375 similar to
the figures above. This is the metric with worst blackouts for all tolerance values.
The same transmission line is selected in Table 3.3 using the above explained
attacks. For every tolerance value and ρ value (0 and 1) the load shedding resulting
from cutting branch 1 is LS = 0.899. Therefore, the worst blackouts are unfold
by these attacks and the net-ability metric. However, any of them obtain the worst
possible blackout.
As is shown in Figure 3.2 the LS average results using ρ = 1 are better than using
ρ = 0, therefore, we will use ρ = 0 in the following simulations in order to obtain
the worst scenario. In the last simulation of the IEEE 14 bus system we will use the
capacities listed in Table 3.1 and increase the demand and injection until one line is
close to exceeding its capacity. Therefore, we increase demand and injection 35%
and we simulate for each branch cut a blackout. Table 3.4 shows the transmission
lines ordered by its blackout LS results and by the different metrics and attacks
compared in this report. In red are colored those transmission lines that have unfold
the worst blackouts.
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Nº line LS Elec. Bet. Eff. Res. Net-ability Node sign. Highest pow.
2 1 1 10 1 1 1
3 1 4 16 7 2 2
4 1 2 15 4 3 3
5 1 5 17 5 6 7
7 1 10 8 2 7 4
10 0.9679 8 11 3 4 10
1 0.8991 3 18 6 8 5
6 0.3969 7 20 10 9 8
9 0.3696 6 13 8 15 15
8 0.2397 15 1 15 17 6
15 0.2397 9 6 16 16 13
13 0.1454 13 19 11 5 9
17 0.0628 16 12 18 20 17
20 0.0628 11 7 17 13 12
11 0 17 9 20 19 11
12 0 18 3 13 10 16
14 0 20 2 9 12 20
16 0 12 4 12 11 18
18 0 19 5 19 18 19
19 0 14 14 14 14 14
Table 3.4 IEEE-14 bus system ordered transmission lines depending on the LS
blackout results and, metrics and attacks suggestions. The most critical lines are
colored red. Therefore, the electrical betweenness metric, the net-ability metric and
the highest power flow attack are the best capturing the most critical lines in the upper
part of the table. The effective resistance metric has the worst results predicting the
critical branches with five of these lines in the bottom.
IEEE-14 bus system discussion
In the first simulations, we can see that, with higher tolerance values υ , blackout
results are better. In average we obtain better LS results using ρ = 1. No attack or
metric has obtained the worst result. However, the node significance and highest
power flow attacks have the worst results for all the tolerance values. Net-ability
has also high LS results. Furthermore, between effective resistance and electrical
betweenness it seems that we obtain worse blackouts using the effective resistance.
With the data obtained from the first simulation, we can only obtain which attack
unfolds the worst blackout. However, in the second simulation Table 3.4 shows
which attack or metric has the worst possible blackouts as first options. Therefore,
it is shown that the electrical betweenness, the net-ability and the highest power flow
attack have seven of the worst blackouts as first options. Node significance attack
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has good results, however branch 5 and 10 are far from the rest of the critical attacks.
Finally, the effective resistance does not obtain the critical transmission lines in the
correct order.
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3.3 IEEE-96 RTS bus system
IEEE-RTS-96 bus system is a 72 buses power grid that can be divided into 3
identical power grids with 24 buses as below:
Figure 3.6 IEEE-RTS-96 24 buses used in order to simulate blackouts system [25]
This is a 24 bus system with 10 generators, 14 load buses and 39 transmission
lines. Branch impedances and capacities as well as bus nominal demands and in-
jections are known. Maximum power injection in generator buses is unknown. In
this case we have lines capacities data, although these branch limits are measured in
MVA. Generators 13 and 15 have less power injection than withdrawal , therefore,
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they will be considered as loads. In this grid the most important generators are in
the upper part. Buses 15 and 13 are considered loads, therefore, the inferior part of
the grid is full of loads. The power flow will go from the upper part to the inferior
part in order to fill the demand.
We do not have the maximum power injection, therefore, it will be calculated
using ϖ = 1.2 as written above . It will be considered the worst blackout case using
ρ = 0 in our simulations. The capacities are in MVA and not in MW and the peak
of demand is represented by a 10% increase, hence, in order to do the simulations
the demand will also be increased by 20%. A 10% increase would represent the
reactive power in transmission lines, thereby, we could use the capacities as MW
values. In addition, as written above, the other 10% increase will represent a more
stressed grid.
Another simulation case will be represented with an increase until one transmis-
sion line is close to exceeding its own capacity. This case is produced with a 50%
increase, therefore we will have 2 simulations using the IEEE-96 RTS bus system:
one with 20% and the other with 50% demand/injection increase.
From this bus system we also have the number of times a transmission line is
cut per year. This value can be useful in order to calculate which could be the most
critical, not only using the damage a transmission line can cause, but its probability
of being cut.
IEEE-96 RTS bus system simulation
In the case with a 20% increase the power grid has an N-1 security, thus, if we
only cut one transmission line a blackout will never occur. Therefore, we will cut
one line and recalculate another one using the metrics and attacks described until
we obtain a blackout. As written above, from the IEEE-96 RTS bus system we
obtain the probability for each line to be cut in a year. Although we do not have the
probability of having a combination of several cut lines, we approximate that the
sum of these probabilities could reflect this possibility. Furthermore, the product of
this value and the LS blackout result could be used as an efficiency number. This
will be called "attack efficiency". When this number is higher the more efficient the
attack is:
attack efficiency =
(
sum of the probabilities
for each line to be cut
)
∗
(
The LS resulted from the blackout
unfolded by these branch cuts
)
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Attacks Electrical Betweenness Net-ability Effective Resistance
Attacked lines 30-24-31 30-24-31 27-6
Load Shedding 0.3093 0.3093 0.6352
Attack efficiency 0.3217 0.3217 0.5017
Attacks Node significance Highest power flow
Attacked lines 21-22 23-22
Load Shedding 0.6352 0.6352
Attack efficiency 0.6415 0.6097
Table 3.5 IEEE-RTS-96 24 buses power grid attack and metrics results. The elec-
trical betweenness and net-ability metrics did not obtain as critical combinations as
the remaining attacks and metric.
Table 3.5 shows different cuts developed by the metrics and attacks studied, and
their results. Attack efficiency values from combination of 2 cuts cannot be com-
pared with the 3 cuts combinations. Moreover, it is important to compare these
values with the best possible attacks for each combination. In order to do that we
have simulated all the 2 and 3 transmission line cut combinations that generate a
blackout. In the following histograms we can see the number of attacks that cause
blackouts with similar results of LS and attack efficiency:
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Figure 3.7 Histogram that clusters the 2 branch combination attacks where their
LS and attack efficiency results are similar. These attacks and metric get some of the
most critical 2 branch combinations.
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Figure 3.8 Histogram that clusters the 3 branch combination attacks where their
LS and attack efficiency results are similar. These metrics did not get some of the
most critical 3 branch combinations.
In both cases, two and three branch cuts, we can find the worst blackout results,
depending on the attack efficiency. These attacks can be used to compare with the
metric results:
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Attacks Attack(2) 1 Attack(2) 2 Attack(2) 3 Attack(2) 4
Attacked lines 2-27 21-23 21-27 27-32
Load Shedding 0.6352 0.6352 0.6352 0.6352
Attack efficiency 0.5843 0.6288 0.591 0.6034
Table 3.6 IEEE-RTS 96 24 bus system worst attack results for 2 branch combina-
tion cuts
Attacks Attack(3) 1 Attack(3) 2 Attack(3) 3 Attack(3) 4
Attacked lines 3-5-22 21-36-37 22-36-37 26-36-37
Load Shedding 0.7535 0.8329 0.8329 0.8329
Attack efficiency 0.9795 1.0328 1.0078 0.9412
Table 3.7 IEEE-96 RTS 24 bus system worst attack results for 3 branch combina-
tion cuts
As written above, we will simulate the IEEE-96 RTS bus system with a 50%
demand/injection increase. In this scenario the grid loses its N-1 security. Therefore,
we will order transmission lines by its blackout LS and attack efficiency results.
Branches will also be ordered by the different metrics and attacks compared in this
report. The following tables compare the critical lines by LS and efficiency attack
with the critical lines by using the metrics and attacks described. In red are colored
the most critical branches depending on the LS or the attack efficiency respectively:
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Nº line LS Elec. Bet. Eff. Res. Net-ability Node sign. Highest pow.
25 0.8329 30 27 30 21 23
26 0.8329 23 10 29 22 28
22 0.6910 29 12 24 36 21
7 0.6351 19 13 23 37 22
11 0.6351 28 8 19 39 7
17 0.6351 27 7 39 25 27
21 0.6351 22 19 27 26 25
23 0.6351 21 1 28 38 26
27 0.6351 39 23 7 33 30
29 0.6351 25 9 22 32 17
18 0.5914 26 29 21 31 38
5 0.0807 7 4 36 17 31
10 0.0807 24 3 37 16 16
1 0.0 38 2 25 10 15
2 0.0 31 24 26 13 19
Table 3.8 IEEE-96 RTS bus system ordered transmission lines depending on the
LS blackout results and, metrics and attacks conclusions. The complete tables can be
found in Appendix A Table A.1 and Table A.2 as the first and the second part of this
table respectively. Colored in red the most critical branches. The highest power flow
attack and the electrical betweenness metric obtain most of the critical branches in
the upper part, followed by the net-ability metric. The worst result is obtained with
the effective resistance suggestion.
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Nº line Attack eff. Elec. Bet. Eff. Res. Net-ability Node sign. Highest pow.
26 0.3415 30 27 30 21 23
22 0.3386 23 10 29 22 28
21 0.3303 29 12 24 36 21
23 0.2985 19 13 23 37 22
11 0.2748 28 8 19 39 7
27 0.2604 27 7 39 25 27
18 0.2366 22 19 27 26 25
29 0.2223 21 1 28 38 26
17 0.1905 39 23 7 33 30
5 0.0387 25 9 22 32 17
10 0.0266 26 29 21 31 38
7 0.0127 7 4 36 17 31
17 0.0127 24 7 37 16 16
Table 3.9 IEEE-96 RTS bus system ordered transmission lines depending on the
attack efficiency blackout results and, metrics and attacks conclusions.The com-
plete table can be found in Appendix A Table A.3. Colored in red the most critical
branches. The highest power flow attack and the electrical betweenness metric ob-
tain most of the critical branches in the upper part, followed by the net-ability metric.
The worst result is obtained with the effective resistance suggestion.
IEEE-96 RTS bus system discussion
In the first simulations, where a combination of branch cuts is necessary in order
to unfold blackouts, node significant attack, highest power flow attack, and effective
resistance metric obtain some of the more LS than the remaining metrics. However,
this is not enough to consider this 3 attacks as the most critical. These three meth-
ods have also high attack efficiency compared with the remaining two branch cut
combinations. Furthermore, we compare these results with other four severe attacks
in Table 3.6. As written above, the power flow must go from the upper part to the
inferior part in order to fill the demand. Therefore, the worst results could happen
when lines in the superior and the middle part are cut.
Furthermore, we compare line cuts in Table 3.6 and two branch cuts in Table 3.5.
Lines 2 and 6 are in the inferior part, lines 27 and 32 are in the superior part, and
lines 21, 22 and 23 connect the inferior and superior part. Therefore, there are two of
these attacks that combine the attack through the transmission line 27 with branch 2
or 6. Hence, this precise attack in the left-inferior side could redirect the power flow
to the right-inferior side and generate a big blackout. Node significance metric and
highest flow attack seem to disconnect middle lines that are crucial to redistribute
the active power through the inferior part.
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The net-ability and the electrical betweenness metrics represent the same line
cuts and must be compared with the three branch cut combinations that develop a
blackout. In this case, three of the worst attacks are based on cutting branches 36 and
37. Furthermore, a big blackout unfolds cutting intermediate lines 26, 22 or 21. In
Attack(3) 1, two branches in the inferior part and one line in the middle part are cut.
Disconnecting lines 3 and 5 could make it more easier for other lines in the inferior
part to overload, here the capacities are lower than in the upper part of the grid.
Moreover, cutting the middle transmission line 22 a blackout is developed. Net-
ability and electrical betweenness did not suggest some of the worst 3 branch cut
combinations. However, the attacks are based on the same tactic as written above:
two attacks in the superior part and one in the intermediate part.
In Table A.1 highest power flow attack and electrical betweenness metric have
branches better ordered. Followed by net-ability metric. Effective resistance metric
seems to have less similitudes with the worst results. Finally, node significance at-
tack only obtains transmission lines 21, 22, 25 and 26 in the superior part of its list.
In Table A.3 the electrical betweenness metric, the net-ability metric and the high-
est power flow attack maintain in the upper part the most of the critical branches.
In addition the effective resistance metric and the node significance attack does not
obtain the critical branches correctly ordered.
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Conclusion
The studied metrics can not always obtain as the first option the most critical
branch that can unfold a blackout. However, electrical betweenness and net-ability
metrics obtain the critical branches within the first options. The highest power flow
attack also obtains similar results. Therefore, they capture the critical transmission
lines in order to unfold blackouts. Then, it might be possible in future assessments
to combine net-ability and electrical betweenness metrics with the nominal power
flow in each line. Hence, those lines that carry high levels of power flow could have
higher weighed metric results not only depending on these metrics, but on its power
flow levels.
However, lines that carry a high amount of power flow are usually more protected
than others, thereby, those branch cuts are improbable. It could be necessary to study
those lines that carry less power flow and are less protected but are more probable
to unfold a critical blackout. Thereby, the probability of having a single line cut or a
combination of line cuts will be useful in future assessments. Introduce these values
in metrics might help them to be more precise in their results. A transmission line
will be more critical not only when it can generate huge damage, but it has higher
probabilities to being cut.
The effective resistance metric did not obtain all the critical branches within its
first suggestions. Therefore, the effective resistance is not capable of capturing the
critical branches of the power grid. In summary, electrical betweenness and net-
ability metrics have good results looking for the weakness of a power grid, how-
ever, these metrics need to be improved in order to use them in blackout prevention
systems. As written above the real probability of being cut is another important
parameter in transmission lines criticality.
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Complete tables
Table A.1 and Table A.2 are the first and the second part of the complete Table 3.8
respectively. Where Table A.3 is the complete Table 3.9.
Nº line LS Elec. Bet. Eff. Res. Net-ability Node sign. Highest pow.
25 0.8329 30 27 30 21 23
26 0.8329 23 10 29 22 28
22 0.6910 29 12 24 36 21
7 0.6351 19 13 23 37 22
11 0.6351 28 8 19 39 7
17 0.6351 27 7 39 25 27
21 0.6351 22 19 27 26 25
23 0.6351 21 1 28 38 26
27 0.6351 39 23 7 33 30
29 0.6351 25 9 22 32 17
18 0.5914 26 29 21 31 38
5 0.0807 7 4 36 17 31
10 0.0807 24 3 37 16 16
1 0.0 38 2 25 10 15
2 0.0 31 24 26 13 19
3 0.0 3 16 38 9 18
4 0.0 18 30 18 23 36
6 0.0 17 6 31 19 37
8 0.0 16 17 34 29 11
Table A.1 IEEE-96 RTS bus system ordered transmission lines depending on the
LS blackout results and, metrics and attacks conclusions. First part of the complete
table of Table 3.8.
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Nº line LS Elec. Bet. Eff. Res. Net-ability Node sign. Highest pow.
9 0.0 36 38 35 34 14
12 0.0 37 21 1 35 10
13 0.0 34 39 20 7 29
14 0.0 35 5 2 6 24
15 0.0 6 28 17 2 32
16 0.0 20 22 16 15 33
19 0.0 9 14 6 14 39
20 0.0 1 15 15 12 3
24 0.0 4 18 8 8 20
28 0.0 32 31 4 11 5
30 0.0 33 20 14 5 34
31 0.0 15 25 32 27 35
32 0.0 14 26 33 24 12
33 0.0 2 32 3 4 8
34 0.0 5 33 9 18 4
35 0.0 8 34 10 20 6
36 0.0 11 35 5 1 13
37 0.0 10 36 12 3 2
38 0.0 13 37 13 30 1
39 0.0 12 11 11 28 9
Table A.2 IEEE-96 RTS bus system ordered transmission lines depending on the
LS blackout results and, metrics and attacks conclusions. Second part of the complete
table of Table 3.8.
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Nº line Attack eff. Elec. Bet. Eff. Res. Net-ability Node sign. Highest pow.
26 0.3415 30 27 30 21 23
22 0.3386 23 10 29 22 28
21 0.3303 29 12 24 36 21
23 0.2985 19 13 23 37 22
11 0.2748 28 8 19 39 7
27 0.2604 27 7 39 25 27
18 0.2366 22 19 27 26 25
29 0.2223 21 1 28 38 26
17 0.1905 39 23 7 33 30
5 0.0387 25 9 22 32 17
10 0.0266 26 29 21 31 38
7 0.0127 7 4 36 17 31
17 0.0127 24 7 37 16 16
1 0.0 38 2 25 10 15
2 0.0 31 24 26 13 19
3 0.0 3 16 38 9 18
4 0.0 18 30 18 23 36
6 0.0 17 6 31 19 37
8 0.0 16 17 34 29 11
9 0.0 36 38 35 34 14
12 0.0 37 21 1 35 10
13 0.0 34 39 20 7 29
14 0.0 35 5 2 6 24
15 0.0 6 28 17 2 32
16 0.0 20 22 16 15 33
19 0.0 9 14 6 14 39
20 0.0 1 15 15 12 3
24 0.0 4 18 8 8 20
28 0.0 32 31 4 11 5
30 0.0 33 20 14 5 34
31 0.0 15 25 32 27 35
32 0.0 14 26 33 24 12
33 0.0 2 32 3 4 8
34 0.0 5 33 9 18 4
35 0.0 8 34 10 20 6
36 0.0 11 35 5 1 13
37 0.0 10 36 12 3 2
38 0.0 13 37 13 30 1
39 0.0 12 11 11 28 9
Table A.3 IEEE-96 RTS bus system ordered transmission lines depending on the
attack efficiency blackout results and, metrics and attacks conclusions. Complete
table of Table 3.9.
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